Abstract-Building the Internet of Things requires deploying a huge number of objects with full or limited connectivity to the Internet. Given that these objects are exposed to attackers and generally not secured-by-design, it is essential to be able to update them, to patch their vulnerabilities and to prevent hackers from enrolling them into botnets. Ideally, the update infrastructure should implement the CIA triad properties, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability. In this work, we investigate how the use of a blockchain infrastructure can meet these requirements, with a focus on availability. In addition, we propose a peer-to-peer mechanism, to spread updates between objects that have limited access to the Internet. Finally, we give an overview of our ongoing prototype implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is today a paradigm that is changing our lives in many ways with respect to how we work, travel, entertain ourselves or communicate. Novel forms of interactions with human users, distributed intelligence, pervasiveness, new topologies, devices and communication technologies shape this evolution. From the nonexpert viewpoint, the digitalization of hitherto human-centric scenarios and the devices by which this digitalization is carried out are its most visible aspects. Practically, it results in a profusion of new computerized objects and appliances.
Individually, it is well-known that each IoT device exhibits specific vulnerabilities to cyberattacks due to multiple factors including longevity, lack of physical protection, hardware shortcomings or stripped down Human Machine Interface. Recent attacks or proof of concept attacks have highlighted how these factors combine with or aggravate improper implementation designs.
With such a mass deployment, the vulnerability property therefore calls for universal software update infrastructures enabling IoT product manufacturers / integrators to remotely maintain software-based equipment. Yet, even the best conceived software update platforms can fall short if they are deliberately targeted as part of a combined attack scenario.
In this work, we investigate the possible use of a blockchain infrastructure to provide software updates to several IoT objects belonging to different manufacturers. As a blockchain relies principally on a peer-to-peer network, we thought intuitively that it may serve as a distributed database for storing and sharing software updates between IoT objects.
In this paper, we show how IoT manufacturers can benefit from the use of a blockchain to ensure updates availability and innocuousness for IoT objects. Availability and also integrity result from the persistence property of the blockchain. That is, once an update is added to the blockchain as part of a valid block, it becomes impossible to erase it. As such, we defeat malicious entities that prevent software updates from being distributed, in order to benefit from current software vulnerabilities. That is, we ensure that updates will be always available for their intended objects. Moreover, the blockchain infrastructure may be assumed to be much more resilient to availability threats e.g., impersonations or Denial of Service (DoS), than the manufacturer's own infrastructure.
In addition, we propose to rely on some nodes in the blockchain to validate an update innocuousness before its transmission to end objects. Innocuousness checking nodes verify that a new update does not contain bugs and resists to known attacks. As such, objects will only download an update that has been approved by some innocuousness checking nodes. These nodes can belong, for example, to national cybersecurity agencies. That is, we protect legitimate objects from downloading insecure updates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the targeted IoT architectures. Section III studies blockchain and its usage in practice. Section IV depicts two mechanisms for software update with a blockchain and their underlying protocols. Section V gives an overview of a prototype implementation done as part of this work. Section VI concludes the paper and gives some future works.
II. TARGETED IOT ARCHITECTURES
Tschofenig and Arkko [1] present smart objects as devices with size, memory, computation or energy constraints. These objects are used in our daily lives to return interesting information about our environment. For example, in smart homes, smart objects may serve to return temperature levels or our energy consumption rates. Smart objects can connect to the Internet to form an Internet of Things (IoT) architecture. Tschofenig et al., [2] distinguish three models of IoT communication:
• Device-to-Device communication concerns smart objects that exchange information in a peer-to-peer manner without accessing the Internet. In this paper, we target the following use cases ( Figure 1 ): 1) Smart Homes: Smart homes interconnect equipments in and near houses with the objective to improve household comfort, increase daily life processes efficiency or reduce house-induced costs [3] . In turn, these objectives require the capabilities to sense, communicate with and control devices attached to highly diversified subsystems such as health, presence detection, energy / water / gas consumption, and leisure. Multivendor, multicontrol systems interoperability is therefore an important requirement of the Smart Home IoT, as is the capability to interact with end users, possibly on a proactive basis [4] . From a topology viewpoint, this interoperability is however rarely provided at the networking lower communication layers, but generally relies on inter-applications communications. Independent vendors in general provide independent gateways that afford their respective devices with uplink communication capability (routing gateways) and/or expose an applicative resource (applicative layer gateway) [5] . These gateways are typically connected to the Internet through an Internet service provider (ISP) box, as can be some devices that rely on IP over WiFi instead of using low-energy IoT radios and protocols. 2) Smart Grids: Smart grids refer to the irruption of communication-based technologies and processes in the operation of energy infrastructures, especially in the fields of transmission protection, monitoring and control, distribution automation, assets management, maintenance and surveillance, distributed energy resources accommodation, demand-response operation and smart metering [6] . The latter application is specific in that it mostly relies on entities deployed at customer premises (the smart meters), which gain uplink connectivity through concentrators, each serving an entire cluster. Smart metering is also specific in that the communication protocols it involves do not exhibit strong quality of service requirements such as those mandated by supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) [7] . Instead, the smart meters use highly robust, lowthroughput, wide-range communications to exchange data with the concentrator. [11] or FlexRay [12] , and external networks such as IEEE802.11p [13] or 3G/4G. Vehicles embedded networks connect 70 to 100 microcontrollers, namely Electronic Control Units (ECUs) 1 . Nowadays, vehicles rely on the On Board Diagnostics (OBD) plug for troubleshooting ECUs and updating their software. However, with opening to external networks and especially to the Internet, autonomous vehicles will support over-the-air update feature. Figure 2 describes an abstract IoT architecture that synthesizes the different components of the aforementioned architectures. First, we define a set of object manufacturers M = {m 1 , . . . , m m }. m i can be a smart meter, a car or even a smart fridge manufacturer. It is worth noting that we have a 1 : n relationship between a manufacturer and its own objects.
Second, we define O i = {o i1 , . . . , o in } as the the set of objects manufactured by m i . That is, each m i ∈ M is managing a set of objects O i . For simplicity sake, we suppose that each manufacturer m i is in charge of n distinct objects. As such, the cardinality of O i,∀i∈ [1,m] equals n.
As presented in Figure 2 , an object can connect to the Internet, and so to its manufacturer cloud, via a gateway G, directly or by hoping through other objects until getting access to the gateway G. That is, an object can participate into a peer-to-peer communication to relay its peers' traffic to a certain gateway. A gateway can simply be a WiFi Access Point in a smart home or a Road Side Unit in an ITS architecture. Note that objects forming a peer-to-peer network do not belong necessarily to the same manufacturer. For example, different brands of cars communicate directly in an ITS context. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN: RELATED WORK
A blockchain [14] is essentially a distributed database of records or a public ledger of digital transactions that have been executed and shared between several participants. Each transaction in the public ledger is verified by consensus of a majority of the participants in the system. Moreover, once entered in the blockchain, information can never be erased. That is, the blockchain provides verifiable records of all transactions.
Bitcoin [15] , the decentralized peer-to-peer digital currency, is the most prominent example of a working blockchain. Before its advent in 2009, digital currencies were seen as unfeasible due to the easiness of reusing digital information. For example, one big issue was the double spending problem of electronic coins. However, bitcoin removed the burden of having a trusted third party to timestamp and validate each electronic transactions thanks to the use of the blockchain. In addition, bitcoin relied on a cryptographic proof-of-work to thwart the double spending problem.
Blockchain technology can rely on two different kinds of ledgers: permissioned ones, also called private or consortium ledgers, and permissionless ones. Permissioned ledgers provide an access control layer, so that the validation of transactions is controlled by a set of authorized and trusted nodes. Meanwhile, a permissionless blockchain relies on a shared public ledger open to anyone. Furthermore, anyone can join as an anonymous validator by participating to the intensive computation of proofs-of-work.
Nowadays, blockchains are applied to several use cases such as:
• Smart Contracts: Ethereum [16] is an example of a blockchain that implements smart contracts. It was specified by Vitalik Buterin who defines a smart contract as "a piece of code implementing arbitrary rules". Buterin proposes to rely on a blockchain for distributed computing and sharing software.
• Decentralized Storage: Storj [17] is a peer-to-peer cloud storage network that uses MetaDisk [18] , a blockchain for decentralized metadata storage.
• Decentralized IoT: Filament is a startup that provides a decentralized IoT software stack that uses the bitcoin blockchain to make devices hold unique identities on a public ledger [19] .
• Anti-counterfeit Solution: BlockVerify provides a blockchain-based anti-counterfeit solutions that introduce transparency to supply chains [19] . It can be applied in pharmaceutical, luxury and electronics industries.
• Blockchain-based Domain Name Server (DNS): Secure decentralized namespaces distribution became a reality thanks to the blockchain infrastructure. It allows the definition of a censorship-resistant domain-name system such as Namecoin [20] , a fork of Bitcoin.
• Blockchain-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):
Fromknecht et al. [21] presented, in 2014, Certcoin a distributed PKI that benefits from the consistency guarantees provided by Bitcoin and Namecoin and that ensures identity retention.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN AND SOFTWARE UPDATES
In this section, we describe how IoT manufacturers can benefit from the use of a blockchain to provide objects updates availability and innocuousness. For simplicity reasons, we will talk only about software updates. However, our presented solutions can be adapted to applications distribution, to network settings sharing or to new configuration profiles dispatching.
We first define the considered attacker model in section IV-A. Then, we depict keys initialization mechanism in section IV-B. Keys are compulsory for updates signing and encryption, and for blockchain operations. In section IV-C, we introduce our first contribution. We show how we can benefit from a blockchain as a distributed database to share updates between several objects. That is, we show how a blockchain can provide updates availability. Then, we go a step further by adding a set of innocuousness checking nodes in the blockchain (section IV-D). These nodes are in charge of validating manufacturers updates before their transmissions to the end objects. That is, these nodes will not only check the integrity of the updates by verifying manufacturers signatures but they will also validate the innocuousness of the received software by checking it for bugs, analyzing its vulnerabilities and testing its resistance to a set of known attacks. The innocuousness checking nodes can be, for example, national cybersecurity agencies and certifying cybersecurity companies. An object will not download an update until it has been approved by a set of innocuousness checking nodes. Section IV-E presents an update acknowledgement protocol. Acknowledgement is important as it creates a history of installed updates. Section IV-F describes a peer-to-peer update protocol which exchanges updates between nodes belonging to the same peer-to-peer network. Peer-to-peer update alleviates the core network and reduces the number of messages needed for data exchange, which results in a gain of bandwidth. Finally, section IV-G investigates our update blockchain bootstrapping.
A. Attacker Model
In this work, we consider a Dolev and Yao attacker model [22] . That is, the attacker is able to read, send and drop a transaction addressed to the blockchain, or any network packet. Of course, she can be passive by connecting to the network and eavesdropping all exchanged messages.
Or, she can be active by injecting, replaying or filtering exchanged information.
Our attacker targets objects, their manufacturers, the update blockchain or even the network:
• Attacking the network: an attacker can try to isolate an object or its manufacturer in order to prevent it from sending a transaction to the blockchain. Here, by isolation, we refer to classical network attacks where the traffic of the attacked node is filtered, or the link between the targeted node and its network is simply cut. As such, a network attacker can prevent an object from sending its acknowledgment transaction of section IV-E. Network isolation attacks can be simply avoided by ensuring that each object or manufacturer has in its routing table redundant paths to the core network. In this work, we do not focus on network isolation attacks but we consider attacks on the update blockchain and its underlying transactions.
• Attacking the blockchain: as the update transactions T or the acknowledgment transactions A are signed by manufacturers and objects respectively, the attacker will not be able to impersonate a manufacturer or an object unless she gets their respective signing keys. However, she can try to prevent a legitimate transaction from appearing into a valid blockchain block, which is equivalent to the double spending problem in bitcoin [15] . By construction, the attacker will have to control more than half of the blockchain nodes to prevent a transaction from appearing in a valid block in the blockchain which is presumably hard [15] . Moreover, manufacturers can check that their updates correctly appear in the blockchain; if this is not the case, it can mean that someone is attacking the blockchain.
• Attacking a manufacturer: as all update transactions T are signed with manufacturers private keys, the attacker will not be able to impersonate a legitimate manufacturer. However, a passive attacker can recover all updates binaries. As such, manufacturers will have to encrypt their updates binaries when their confidentiality e.g., intellectual property, is a concern.
• Attacking an object: as an attacker can hack into an object where keys are stored in a HSM, she is able to recover all the updates, even the encrypted ones. Indeed, she has simply to dump the memory of the hacked object to get the last software update. In this work, we do not address the problem of confidentiality within hacked objects. However, we consider the insider attack where a hacked object is used by an attacker to spread wrong updates notifications. That is, she is targeting the the peer-to-peer update protocol of section IV-F.
B. Keys Initialization
We consider a manufacturer (m i ) who sells some objects (O i ) and who, for some good and legitimate reasons, wishes to perform software updates on these objects once fielded. Let us assume that the manufacturer has its own master public/secret keys pair, say pk mi and sk mi , and that it also generates such a pair for each object o ik , say pk oik and sk oik . Before shipping object o ik , the manufacturer somehow 
C. Blockchain and Updates Availability
In order, to generate an update U for object o ik , m i proceeds in a utterly classical fashion by signing U by means of sk mi and then encrypting U and the signature under pk oik . Upon receiving (or retrieving) an update U, the object would also proceed in a classical fashion, by decrypting the bundle, checking the signature and, if both operations are successful, applying the update. So far, everything works smoothly enough without any blockchain infrastructure as we seemingly have solved both integrity and confidentiality issues within our reference architecture (assuming of course that neither the manufacturer nor the objects -or at least the subset of them owning the cryptographic material -are compromised).
Having said that, a blockchain infrastructure (Figure 3 ) can help in terms of availability as a blockchain with a critical-enough mass would bring the following two properties: 1) Persistence in time of anything written to it e.g., once written into the supporting blockchain, a legitimatesigned -software upgrade towards a given object will remain there, unaltered ad vitam eternam.
2) The blockchain infrastructure may be assumed to be much more resistant to availability threats e.g., impersonations or Denial of Service (DoS), than the manufacturer's own infrastructure. As an example, an object could periodically poll the blockchain by picking randomly one of its supporting nodes and checking whether or not one or more updates have been posted for it (in which case it applies either all of them or the last one, depending on the system design). In this context, a blockchain with access rights management would be a plus (in terms of system load optimization) but is not necessary in terms of security properties.
Thanks to this architecture, it becomes possible to provide liveness guarantees on a software upgrade system. Then, an attacker who would attempt a DoS on an IoT software update system e.g., in order to maintain an actionable vulnerability which would be fixed by an update, would be able to do so only via a DoS attack on the blockchain (which is presumed hard) or by flooding the blockchain with invalid software upgrades. Although the latter strategy may not be prevented by the blockchain infrastructure, it is not at all stealthy and can be detected by the manufacturer (whereas a man-in-the-middle on a manufacturer's own infrastructure would be both stealthy and unbounded in time).
It therefore appears that bringing a (massive-enough) blockchain into the picture would allow many manufacturers to share the burden of countering availability threats on their software upgrade infrastructures (to some extent it could be generalized to their overall communication infrastructure when availability is a stake). Per se, this is interesting as availability is all too often the Cinderella of the security pillars.
We define a manufacturer update transaction, corresponding to an update U, as the tuple
where T id is a transaction identifier, U id is an update identifier, U v is an update version, U bin is an update binary or an encrypted update binary, O type is an object type, M id is a manufacturer identifier and M sign is M id signature of all the previous fields. U id can be simply the hash of U bin .
Finally, note that when an update confidentiality is a concern, a manufacturer will have to encrypt an update binary U bin of a transaction T before pushing it into the blockchain. Broadcast encryption mechanisms, such as those used for Pay TV, can be used to provide more efficient encryption of U bin [23] , [24] .
D. Blockchain and Updates Innocuousness
In this section, we consider that manufacturers are not including update binaries into update transactions T i.e.,
When a transaction T is pushed to the blockchain, it just serves to notify concerned objects that their manufacturer has a new software update available for download. However, objects will not download and install this new update until a set of innocuousness checking nodes have approved it.
Indeed, we extend the blockchain infrastructure by a set of k innocuousness checking nodes I = {i 1 , . . . , i k } (Figure 4) . These nodes can belong to national cybersecurity agencies, or certifying and certified cybersecurity companies. These innocuousness checking nodes receive the new update binary U bin directly from the manufacturer. Then, they not only check the integrity of the manufacturer signature of U bin but also the innocuousness of U bin itself against bugs and known attacks.
An object interested in a new update U will refrain from downloading U till at least k 2 + 1 nodes of I have approved the innocuousness of U bin and acknowledged it in the blockchain.
Let us assume that we have a complex system containing several objects coming from different manufacturers. One of these manufacturers may become malicious and install a malware in its object to spy on other objects or to collect end user private data. If the use of our blockchain architecture extended by innocuousness checking nodes is enforced by a global security policy, or even a law, such a malware will be detected by the innocuousness checking nodes. In addition, the latter will push a negative acknowledgment for this malicious update into the blockchain. The advantage of using this approach compared to the one of the previous section IV-C is mainly reducing the size of the blockchain by removing update binaries. However, extending the blockchain with k innocuousness checking nodes implies providing each object with k different public keys. These keys are compulsory for validating the acknowledgments of innocuousness checking nodes. However, keys management can become a disadvantage when k exceeds a certain threshold.
E. Update Acknowledgment
Once an object or an innocuousness checking node has installed an update and approved it, it must acknowledge its installation by sending a special transaction to the blockchain. We identify two types of acknowledgment transactions:
• We define a positive acknowledgment transaction as the tuple A = (A id , U id , O id , O sign ) where A id is an acknowledgment identifier, U id an update identifier, O id an acknowledging object or an innocuousness checking node identifier and O sign is O id signature of all the previous fields.
• We define a negative acknowledgment transaction as the tuple
where NA id is a negative acknowledgment identifier, U id an update identifier, O id an acknowledging object or an innocuousness checking node identifier, MO id a malicious object or a malicious manufacturer identifier and O sign is O id signature of all the previous fields. Negative acknowledgment by innocuousness checking nodes of an advertised new update can serve as a metric for detecting misbehaving manufacturers (section IV-D).
Meanwhile negative acknowledgments referring to the same misbehaving object and coming from its peers can be used as a metric for insider attacker detection as presented in the upcoming section IV-F. These acknowledgments are important as they permit to maintain a history of downloaded object updates, providing a simple accountability and logging system.
F. Peer-to-Peer Update
The peer-to-peer update protocol is only interesting when the update binary (i.e., U bin ) is not included in the blockchain. Indeed, if U bin is included in the transaction as in section IV-C, every object will be notified by its manufacturer about the last available U bin . However, when U bin is not present in the update transaction as for section IV-D, we can benefit from the peer-to-peer nature of the IoT architecture to share update between nodes of the same type and from the same manufacturer.
Once an object o ij has acknowledged the reception of an update U from m i , it can share it with another object o ik as presented in Figure 5: 1) First, o ij broadcasts 3 an UpdateNotification to inform other m i objects that it possesses a new update U. The UpdateNotification contains an object identifier o ij , an update identifier U id , a challenge c, a signature of all the previous fields and cert oij of o ij . At the reception of UpdateNotification, o ik validates cert oij . Then, it checks that o ij has acknowledged the reception of U id binary i.e., U bin in the blockchain by finding and validating the acknowledgment transaction with sk oik . Then, its checks U bin integrity by comparing the hash of the received U bin to the one signed by m i and stored in the blockchain in the transaction
. If the two hashes are equal, o ik installs U bin and acknowledges it with the mechanism of section IV-E. Note that when U bin confidentiality is not a concern, the peer-to-peer update protocol is slightly changed. Now, o ij sends U bin in clear in the UpdateTransfer. At this point, one can ask why we have not included U bin in the UpdateNotification and so reduced the number of exchanged messages from 3 to 1. Indeed, if we do add U bin to UpdateNotification, we will first assume that the peerto-peer network contains for sure other objects belonging to the same manufacturer and having the same type as o ij . Second, we will accept that o ij floods the network with large messages, as U bin can be some megabytes long, without having the insurance that some objects will be interested in receiving the update from o ij .
Let us suppose that o ij has been hacked and became a malicious node. That is, we assume that an insider attacker is present in the peer-to-peer network. This attacker executes the peer-to-peer update protocol and sends a valid UpdateNotification with a good U id . Then, she receives a valid UpdateRequest from a legitimate o ik . Finally, the attacker sends in UpdateTransfer a malicious U bin that does not correspond to U id to lure o ik . However, o ik detects easily that o ij has sent an invalid U bin by comparing U bin hash to the one signed by the manufacturer m i and already present in the blockchain. In addition, o ik pushes a negative acknowledgment transaction NA to notify other objects and its manufacturer about o ij misbehavior.
G. Blockchain Infrastructure Bootstrapping
An important issue, with respect to the aforementioned persistence property 1 (from section IV-C), is how to live with a blockchain without a critical-enough mass as, at least upon system comissioning, it is unavoidable. One interesting idea is to use an already-critical-enough blockchain, let us call it the parent blockchain, to bootstrap the new blockchain by storing for example the hashes of all the records in the new blockchain within the parent one. This can be done either systematically under the responsibility of the blockchain nodes or only on a per-manufacturer basis under the responsibility of each manufacturers. In the first case, for a record in the child blockchain to be considered valid, it is necessary to find its hash within an anterior record in the parent blockchain. In the second case, the burden storing hashes in the parent blockchain lies on the manufacturers which can thus optionally choose to deploy that mechanism or not (depending on its cost effectiveness with respect to their use case). Then before submitting a record to the child blockchain, a signed hash for that record is first written to the parent blockchain (and its existence and signature will be checked -by the objects -as a necessary condition for record integrity). For example, at small cost, these hashes (or signed hashes) could be stored in the bitcoin blockchain within the so-called OP_RETURN field of zerosum transactions between wallets belonging to the same entity. It should be emphasized that this latter approach of (mis)using the bitcoin blockchain for storing data, which we consider here only for the sake of giving an example, is considered bad practice by the bitcoin community and as such is discouraged. Other blockchain infrastructures can be used but at the time of writing, only the bitcoin blockchain has reached a critical-enough mass with an amazing ≈ 2 60 SHA256 computations/secs. In comparision, the second "largest" blockchain, Ethereum, is "only" at around ≈ 2 40 such computations per seconds meaning that a well-funded adversary can still catch up with that blockchain and jeopardize persistence.
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation. We use MultiChain -open source software that is suitable for implementing a private permissioned blockchain and storing data. MultiChain is strongly inspired from and compatible with bitcoin, a successfully deployed blockchain.
A. Prototype Architecture
Our prototype is made of three main components (see Fig. 6 ): (i) a web portal, (ii) the blockchain infrastructure, and (iii) IoT devices.
The web portal allows manufacturers to deploy software updates securely and easily. It is hosted on a dedicated server. The web portal has access to the blockchain infrastructure, which is shared and mutualized. Each manufacturer is expected to provide at least one worker node to increase the availability and the computing power of the infrastructure. In our proof of concept, blockchain nodes are implemented as Virtual Machines (VMs) and are hosted on a XenServer server.
The web portal and the IoT devices can exchange software updates and acknowledgments, by means of the blockchain infrastructure. We rely on asymmetric cryptography to guarantee data confidentiality and integrity, by generating and deploying RSA keys with GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). For our future work, we want to investigate lightweight cryptography mechanisms that are more suited to very constrained IoT devices.
The IoT devices are implemented either (i) physically by means of development boards, such as Raspberry Pi, that are rather close to real field devices, or (ii) virtually, by means of Qemu virtual machines, to evaluate the scalability of the prototype. Currently, the Qemu VMs run on a single dedicated server, which can host up to 800 IoT VMs. This is pretty small compared to a real IoT infrastructure, but this is only a first step before performing larger scale experiments and simulations.
B. Update Process
Once the prototype infrastructure is up and running, the update process works as follows.
A manufacturer first connects to the web portal. She selects a set of IoT devices to update. Then, she uploads a software update to the portal. She can add metadata to describe the update, like the name, date, commit/build number, etc. She can choose to (i) only sign the update, or to (ii) sign and encrypt it. The advantage of the former method is that only one, unencrypted, file will be pushed to the blockchain, while the latter method ensures confidentiality. Thus, the latter provides a stronger protection for intellectual property. However, it requires to push as many files as there are devices. Indeed, we assume that the decryption/secret key is specific to each device. For our future work, we plan to use encryption broadcast mechanisms such as those used for Pay TV to avoid this dedicated encryption per device. The manufacturer finally sends the software update to the blockchain infrastructure.
The blockchain infrastructure then validates the transaction(s) within seconds.
Meanwhile, each IoT device periodically connects to the blockchain and checks whether a new update is available for download. If so, the IoT device downloads the update and installs it. Finally, it sends an acknowledgment to the blockchain to keep track of up-to-date devices.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated how a blockchain infrastructure can help in securing the deployment of updates for IoT devices. We enlightened the fact that, by design, a blockchain dramatically improves updates availability, due to the persistence and DoS risk mitigation properties. We refined our proposal to (i) allow extensive update innocuousness checking, by relying on trusted actors like national cybersecurity agencies; (ii) keep track of up-to-date devices; (iii) identify potentially malicious objects or manufacturers, therefore providing a building block for accountability; (iv) integrate a peer-to-peer mechanism, to reduce the load on the blockchain infrastructure and enable objects with degraded or intermittent Internet access to retrieve updates.
For our future work, we consider several improvements. First, we will evaluate broadcast encryption mechanisms, to provide the confidentiality property at a lower cost, without having to deploy a dedicated update for each IoT device. Then, we will study if these mechanisms are compatible with resource-constrained objects, or if we have to tune these mechanisms to leverage lightweight cryptography. Second, we will investigate the use of threshold signatures in order to reduce the number of transactions transmitted by innocuousness checking nodes. Indeed, the latter will use a threshold signature to sign only one transaction to acknowledge the approval of an update instead of transmitting, at least, k 2 + 1 acknowledgment transactions as currently proposed. Finally, it could be interesting to investigate which economic models can be built on this kind of distributed infrastructure; for instance, object manufacturers could give (financial) incentives to encourage object owners to retrieve updates by means of the peer-to-peer mechanism, in order to decrease the load on the blockchain infrastructure.
